Do you not see the reason for yourself? Political Withdrawal and the Experience of Epistemic Friction by Schaap, AW
 1 
Do you not see the reason for yourself? Political Withdrawal and the Experience of 
Epistemic Friction 
 
Andrew Schaap, University of Exeter 
Forthcoming in Political Studies 
 
The epistemic friction that is generated when privileged subjects are confronted by different 
social perspectives is important for democratic politics. For it can interrupt their active 
ignorance about oppressive social relations from which they benefit. However, members of 
oppressed groups might sometimes prefer not to accept the burden of educating the dominant. 
In circumstances of structural inequality, withdrawing from privileged subjects’ ignorance 
can be a form of self-preservation. Yet such withdrawal also the potential to induce epistemic 
friction insofar as it depletes the opportunities for active ignorance to reproduce itself. 
Herman Melville’s tragicomic short story of Bartleby - the legal-copyist who ‘would prefer 
not to’ - has been celebrated by philosophers as emblematic of such resistant withdrawal. 
Interpreting the story as a dramatization of the epistemic friction encountered by its narrator 




The next day I noticed that Bartleby did nothing but stand at his window in his 
dead-wall revery. Upon asking him why he did not write, he said that he had 
decided upon doing no more writing. 
“Why, how now? What next?” exclaimed I, “do no more writing?” 
“No more.” 
“And what is the reason?” 
“Do you not see the reason for yourself,” he indifferently replied. 
(Melville [1853] 1989, 181) 
 
Social inequalities are sustained and reproduced by the active ignorance of privileged social 
groups, which resists knowledge of oppression. Such ignorance is cultivated through habits of 
perception that exclude, marginalise and assimilate the experiences, views and concerns of 
differently situated others, which would otherwise challenge the world-view of the dominant. 
Consequently, when members of oppressed groups call attention to the structural 
impediments that limit their political participation, they often appear to privileged subjects to 
be the problem - to be ‘wall-makers’ who are creating barriers for themselves (Ahmed 2017: 
141). For privileged subjects typically do not see the walls against which members of 
oppressed groups constantly come up and through which the privileges of a dominant group 
are maintained. 
If active ignorance allows the dominant to comfortably inhabit the unequal social 
structure from which they benefit, epistemic friction is experienced when the habits of 
perception that sustain and reproduce this structure are interrupted (Medina 2013). Epistemic 
friction is generated when marginalized groups succeed in forcing their social perspectives 
into a public sphere, making perceptible to privileged subjects the institutional walls that they 
are invested in not seeing. While disconcerting, this experience also affords dominant 
subjects the opportunity to become more reflexive about their social position. Yet, since the 
burdens of epistemic friction are borne most heavily by oppressed subjects, activists often 
respond to ignorant questions from apparently well-meaning privileged subjects with: “It is 
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not my job to educate you.” Such withdrawal in the face of active ignorance can be a form of 
self-preservation, conserving one’s intellectual, material and affective labour for self-directed 
ends rather than allowing it to be drained by the demands of the dominant. However, 
withdrawal also has the potential to induce epistemic friction by disrupting active ignorance 
from within its own field of possibilities. 
The protagonist of Herman Melville’s [1853] short story, ‘Bartleby, the Scrivener’, can 
be seen as an epistemic anti-hero who enacts such a withdrawal (see Attell 2013). Bartleby is 
employed as a legal copyist by the unnamed Lawyer who narrates the story. While he begins 
industriously, within a few days of his employment Bartleby disconcerts his employer by 
mildly responding to the Lawyer’s instructions that he ‘would prefer not to.’ Each time he 
politely expresses his preference not to, Bartleby withdraws further from the narrator’s social 
world while becoming an increasingly uncanny presence within it. Having given up copying, 
Bartleby spends most of his time contemplating the lifeless walls that surround the Lawyer’s 
office, seeming to apprehend in them something that the Lawyer can only dimly intuit. When 
the Lawyer asks him why he will not work, as Bartleby stares at the wall that the window in 
front of his desk faces onto, he responds: ‘Do you not see the reason for yourself’. 
As Mihaela Mihai (2018) discusses, literature can be an important resource to combat 
active ignorance due to its seductive power to illuminate the epistemic limitations of its 
readers. Rather than provoking epistemic friction on the part of its readers, however, 
Melville’s story dramatizes the epistemic friction experienced by its narrator. As such, the 
story itself reveals how withdrawal is not only instrumental (insofar as it is directed toward 
self-transformation) but can also be world-disclosing (insofar as it interrupts the habits of 
perception of the dominant). Bartleby does not generate epistemic friction by inserting a 
marginalized perspective into the social world of the Lawyer. Rather, his withdrawal induces 
epistemic friction from within the Lawyer’s social world by depleting it of opportunities to 
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reproduce itself. Consequently, his withdrawal makes the social world of the Lawyer, which 
the narrator had previously moved so comfortably within, seem unfamiliar to him. While the 
Lawyer regards himself as a competent, reasonable and compassionate man, Bartleby drives 
him to distraction, calling into question his self-understanding. 
Interpreting the story in terms of the narrator’s world-disclosing encounter with 
Bartleby, moreover, provokes political reflection on the part of its readers about the dynamics 
of epistemic friction. As readers, we enjoy observing how the experience of epistemic friction 
reveals to us, even more than to the narrator himself, the limits of the Lawyer’s world-view. 
As such, we might be tempted to stand in moral judgment of the character of the narrator as 
smug, sentimental and blind to his own complicity in the system that destroys Bartleby. Yet, 
the story also invites reflection about the stubborn persistence of active ignorance, which 
prevents such a good-natured interlocutor such as the Lawyer from apprehending the walls 
that confine Bartleby. The reader’s attention thus shifts from the strangeness of Bartleby’s 
behaviour to the ‘space of the political’: the world of the narrator in relation to which 
Bartleby’s behaviour appears strange (Frank 2013, 4). The point of this interpretation, then, is 
not simply to illustrate political theory by showing how epistemic friction can be induced 
through withdrawal. Rather it is to draw on this literary work as a source of political thought, 
which reveals the manifold aspects in which epistemic friction might be experienced 
(Whitebrook 1995, 57-58; Ingle 1999, 339). 
 
The Politics of Epistemic Friction 
In 2014, Reni Edo-Lodge (2014), the British author and journalist, declared on her BLOG 
that she was ‘no longer talking to white people about race’ since she no longer wanted to 
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engage with the ‘emotional disconnect that white people display when a person of colour 
articulates our experiences.’ She continues: 
I just can’t engage with the bewilderment and the defensiveness as they try to grapple 
with the fact that not everyone experiences the world in the way that they do. They’ve 
never had to think about what it means, in power terms, to be white - so any time 
they’re vaguely reminded of this fact, they interpret it as an affront. (Edo-Lodge 2014) 
Understanding structural racism, Edo-Lodge points out, ‘still requires people of colour to 
prioritise white feelings’ since most white people become bored, indignant or defensive when 
their racial privilege is challenged. Edo-Lodge (2014) reflects that while she does not have 
the power to change the world she can set boundaries and interrupt the entitlement that white 
people feel towards her by ‘stopping the conversation.’ 
Hannah Gadsby (2018) similarly announced, in her comedy show, Nanette, that she 
would quit comedy because she was no longer willing to relieve the tension that heteronormal 
people experience around LGBTQ+ people. Gadsby explains that a joke is essentially a 
question that has been infused with tension by the comedian, which the surprise answer 
relieves by making the audience laugh. She points out that she has been learning the art of 
tension diffusion since childhood when it was not a job or a hobby but a survival tactic. When 
she used to joke about experiences she had with straight people, who found her difficult to 
place within their heteronormative world view, she would not talk about her experience of 
homophobic violence in order for her jokes to work. However, she announces, ‘this tension, 
it’s yours. I am not helping you anymore. You need to learn what this feels like because this 
tension is what not-normals carry inside of them all of the time because it is dangerous to be 
different’ (Gadsby 2018). 
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Edo-Lodge and Gadsby both draw attention to active ignorance. Such ignorance does 
not refer to an arbitrary deficiency of information about certain aspects of social life. Rather, 
it is socially produced, reflecting and reproducing structural inequalities based on social 
differences, such as race and sexuality (Bailey 2007: 77). As Charles Mills (2017, 49) 
describes it, such ignorance is not the ‘passive obverse to knowledge’ but is ‘militant, 
aggressive, not to be intimidated.’ Nor is it confined to the average citizen with which 
democratic theory is often preoccupied but is also propagated by elites. José Medina (2013: 
30-40) highlights how active ignorance is perpetuated by three epistemic vices, to which 
members of socially dominant groups are prone. Since we enjoy the privilege of being 
presumed to know (and are therefore used to being accepted as credible speakers), members 
of privileged groups are prone to arrogance: we tend to over-estimate our own cognitive 
capacities and find it hard to recognize our own assumptions and biases. Due to the privilege 
of not needing to know about many aspects of the social world, we are also prone to epistemic 
laziness: we lack curiosity about social domains that we have learned not to concern 
ourselves with. Finally, as a consequence of needing not to know about the consequences of 
structural inequality from which we benefit, members of privileged groups are also prone to 
closed-mindedness: denying, minimising or distorting the experience of oppression and 
violence in order to avoid confronting our complicity in structural violence. In conditions of 
structural inequality, views articulated from the perspective of an oppressed social group thus 
rarely find a receptive audience. Members of oppressed social groups are less likely to be 
listened to and often find their views disregarded. They may struggle to articulate their 
socially situated experiences within the terms of political discourse available to them (Fricker 
2007). Moreover, the views they do articulate are vulnerable to appropriation since they are 
expected to explain themselves on unequal discursive terms (Sanders 1997; Young 2001).  
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Challenging active ignorance therefore seems to demand heroic action by members of 
oppressed groups who must negotiate the unequal speech situation in which political 
interaction takes place. Despite the material obstacles that work against their political 
participation, Medina argues that members of oppressed groups have the potential for a 
subversive lucidity that enables a critical self-questioning of the constitution of society. This 
is due to what W.E.B. Du Bois called the ‘double-consciousness’ of marginalized groups who 
see the world both from their own social perspective and that of the dominant group (Medina 
2013: 46, 104f.). Members of oppressed groups are likely to be more aware of the limits of 
their own social perspective since they are used to it being questioned. They are more likely 
to be curious about other kinds of knowledge, which they often need in order to navigate the 
social conditions that disadvantage them. They are more likely to be attentive to other social 
perspectives since they have no choice but to see reality from the perspective of the dominant 
group as well was their own. The presence of epistemic counterpoints of marginalised social 
groups within the public sphere thus has the potential to make visible the active ignorance of 
privileged groups so that it becomes contestable. 
The inclusion of marginalized social perspectives is therefore important for democratic 
politics because it generates epistemic friction. The notion of epistemic friction indicates how 
democratic politics is not only a matter of exchanging reasons within an already constituted 
public sphere. Rather, democratic politics often involves a struggle to (re)constitute the space 
of the political within which reasons and subjects appear intelligible or nonsensical, 
reasonable or absurd (see Schaap 2009). As Medina (2013, 18) notes, privileged subjects are 
likely to experience epistemic friction as disempowering since it makes them ‘vulnerable, 
undermines their authority and requires them to pay attention to things that can be 
uncomfortable.’ In contrast, active ignorance is a kind of anti-democratic resistance to the 
social perspectives of marginalized groups. At an individual level, it entails a reluctance to 
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learn from or accept as credible the perspectives of differently situated others. When it 
structures the context within which different groups interact, it involves practices that censor, 
silence or inhibit the formation of others’ beliefs or cast doubt on their testimony (Medina 
2013, 50). As such, active ignorance can be understood as a way of evading or avoiding the 
experience of epistemic friction (Medina 2013, 10, 185). Indeed, active ignorance 
characteristically entails what Medina calls ‘meta-blindness’, which refers not just to an 
inability to see alternative perspectives but an inability to recognize this inability: the field of 
the invisible that is constitutive of one’s own social perspective (Spanos 2015).2  
Privileged groups thus depend other social groups and cultures to recognize ‘aspects of 
the social world that they do not see but should care about’ (Medina 2013, 76). Epistemic 
friction has the potential to reveal the prejudices and biases of privileged groups, forcing 
them to be self-critical, to recognize cognitive gaps and justify their assumptions about the 
social world (Medina 2013, 50). While Medina stresses the importance of epistemic friction 
as a condition of possibility for the democratization of the space of the political, however, he 
does not analyse its political dynamics (Medina 2013, 76, 215; see Mihai 2018, 412, note 4). 
Mihaela Mihai begins to develop such an account by distinguishing between three registers in 
which privileged subjects experience discomfort ‘when confronted with different pictures of 
epistemic authority and agency than the ones they are invested in’ (Mihai 2018, 398).  As 
Mihai (2018) elaborates, epistemic friction has the potential to illuminate three kinds of 
limitations that structure experience. Ideational epistemic friction can make us aware of the 
limits of our received ideas and beliefs through which we make sense of the social world. 
This includes our understanding of relations of authority and our assumptions about the 
proper way of doing things, which structure our social interactions. Moral epistemic friction 
can make us aware of the limits of our sense of justice. This includes what we recognize as an 
injustice, our sense of what we are mutually entitled to and what we are responsible for. 
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Sensorial epistemic friction can make us aware of the limits of our emotional sensibility and 
social embodiment. This includes how we acknowledge social suffering, extend solidarity to 
members of different social groups and orient ourselves within social space. 
This depiction of epistemic friction as emerging from the confrontation of different 
social perspectives is consonant with a conception of democratic politics as a struggle for 
equality between unequal social groups rather than a mutual engagement of social 
perspectives (see Deranty & Renault 2009). As such, it is important to recognize the risks and 
the burdens associated with staging such a confrontation. For, if privileged subjects 
commonly avoid the experience of epistemic friction through active ignorance and depend on 
the help of oppressed subjects to overcome their meta-blindness, the burden of epistemic 
friction seems to rest most heavily with members of oppressed groups (Ahmed 2017). Medina 
(2013, 116) acknowledges that ‘oppressed subjects are not obligated to facilitate the 
communicative and epistemic agency of more privileged subjects if that can worsen their 
precarious situation and deepen their oppression.’ Nonetheless, he highlights how the most 
responsible epistemic agents are typically also those most disadvantaged by the structural 
inequality they want to challenge (Medina 2013, 197). In particular, he discusses the role of 
‘epistemic heroes’ who courageously resist active ignorance by testifying to the experience 
they share with other members of their social group. Epistemic heroes generate epistemic 
friction in refusing to be silenced (introducing new narratives and cognitive standpoints) and 
by forcing their way into public spheres (appearing politically through insurrectionary acts 
and contestatory practices) (Medina 2013, 234). Importantly, transformations of political 
consciousness are not achieved by isolated actions of individuals but by social networks 
within which acts of resistance are reiterated. While they emerge from and are supported by 
social movements, acts by individual epistemic heroes can nevertheless become emblematic 
insofar as ‘they epitomize the daily struggles of resistance of ordinary people within a social 
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movement or network’ (Medina 2013, 187; 234-248). The words and actions of epistemic 
heroes thus democratize politics itself. 
How, then, might the kind of political withdrawal announced by Gadsby and Edo-
Lodge, generate a similar experience of epistemic friction among privileged subjects? Medina 
(2013, 101) recognizes that sometimes members of oppressed groups ‘do not communicate 
about certain things not because they are hermeneutically incapable of doing so, but because, 
given the special vulnerabilities they have accrued it is not in their interest to do so.’ Reni 
Edo-Lodge and Hannah Gadsby similarly emphasise how withdrawal is important in order to 
care for themselves. This aspect of withdrawal leads Jennet Kirkpatrick (2017, 55) to 
characterise withdrawal as instrumental and individual since it is primarily directed toward 
self-transformation. In contrast, she characterises exit as more political because it is 
expressive and collective in opposing existing relations of power. However, withdrawal also 
differs importantly from exit insofar as the agent remains present. While withdrawing their 
social perspective from the field of representation, they do not leave the political scene but 
continue to inhabit it. Withdrawal does not directly oppose the institutional arrangements that 
an actor ceases to co-operate with. Yet it can nonetheless be constitutive (or, better 
‘destitutive’) insofar it ‘incites interaction without demanding it’ (Ferguson 2002: 9; see 
Agamben 2014). Such a silent presence may be intensely political insofar as it interrupts the 
habits of perception of privileged subjects and provokes a reflexive response. 
José Medina (2013, 194, 204) generally insists that epistemic fiction comes about 
through an interactive process in which alternative standpoints are available. In an 
illuminating discussion of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, however, he hints at how epistemic 
friction might sometimes be exerted ‘from the inside’ of a dominant social perspective 
(Medina 2013, 199). The unnamed narrator of the novel observes that white people ‘see only 
my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination, everything and anything 
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except me’ (Ellison 1952, 7).3 Rather than challenging white ignorance, he eventually decides 
to strategically exploit the blind-spots of active ignorance by becoming ‘a supersensitive 
confirmer of their misconceptions’ (Ellison 1952, 384 - cited by Medina 2013, 198). As such, 
the narrator aims to turn white ignorance on itself in order to make it ‘feel its own 
limitations…the weight of its own ignorance as a burden that makes it dysfunctional or non-
functional’ (Medina 2013, 199). Like the narrator of Invisible Man, we might consider 
members of oppressed groups who withdraw in the face of the active ignorance of a dominant 
group to act as epistemic anti-heroes (see Schafer 1968). This is not to suggest that political 
withdrawal is any less courageous than oppositional political engagement. Rather, such 
political withdrawal is anti-heroic insofar as refuses to accept the educative role that is often 
expected of members of oppressed groups in democratic politics: to lead privileged subjects 
on a journey out of their own ignorance. Yet it is anti-heroic insofar as it is not only self-
regarding but has the potential to induce epistemic friction from within the social perspective 
of privileged subjects. 
 
Active ignorance, disconcerted 
‘Nothing so aggravates an earnest person as a passive resistance’, declares the unnamed 
narrator of Melville’s short story: a lawyer with chambers on Wall St, who makes a living 
doing a ‘snug business among rich men’s bonds and mortgages and title deeds’ (170, 156). 
By his own account, the Lawyer is privileged. Moreover, the Lawyer recounts the story of his 
strange encounter with Bartleby from this privileged perspective, confessing that (almost) all 
he knows of Bartleby is what his ‘own astonished eyes saw’ of him (156). Indeed, it is 
striking that he thinks that it is ‘indispensable to an adequate understanding’ of Bartleby that 
he first describes his possessions, making ‘some mention of myself, my employees, my 
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business, my chambers, and general surroundings’ (156 – emphasis added; cf. Moreton-
Robinson 2015). 
The Lawyer describes himself as a man who lives by the conviction that the ‘easiest 
way of life is the best’ (156). He sees himself as a competent, reasonable and compassionate 
man, who prides himself on his ‘prudence’ and ‘method’ (156). He presents himself as 
orderly and patient while also able to adapt to circumstance and accommodate the failings 
and differences of others. He seldom loses his temper or indulges ‘in dangerous indignation at 
wrongs and outrages’ (157). The Lawyer’s attitude to his employees is paternalistic, 
reflecting a relation of social inequality. For, as Norman Springer (1965: 411) observes, he 
sees his employees as ‘beneath him in self-control, intelligence and attainment.’ His sense of 
entitlement is based on his social position as employer and pride in his own competence as 
the originator of the legal documents that his employees merely copy. He therefore enjoys 
describing each of them at some length to the reader in order to place each according to his 
own world-view. 
The Lawyer’s apparently comfortable world is irremediably disrupted when he 
employs Bartleby as a legal copyist. Unlike his other employees, the Lawyer is unable to 
place Bartleby, who remains enigmatic to him. The Lawyer first engages Bartleby, despite his 
strange appearance (‘pallidly neat, pitiably respectable, incurably forlorn!’), because he is 
glad to have an employee of ‘so singularly sedate an aspect’, who he hopes will balance the 
flightiness and fieriness of his other employees (164). At first, Bartleby works hard despite 
his apparent lack of appetite for the job, writing on ‘silently, palely, mechanically’ (164). Yet, 
while the other scriveners, Turkey and Nippers, resign themselves to the ‘dry, husky’ (163) 
business of copying despite the bad temper it puts them in, only Bartleby eventually declines 
to do any work at all. The Lawyer’s privilege is reflected in his disposition and demeanour 
when he ‘abruptly’ calls Bartleby, holding out a copy for him to take in ‘natural expectance 
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of instant compliance’ (165). The Lawyer is taken aback when Bartleby, without getting up 
from his desk, replies ‘in a singularly mild, firm voice…“I would prefer not to”’ (165). He 
does so with a ‘mild effrontery’ that so disarms the Lawyer that he becomes unsure of his 
own authority. As the story unfolds, however, Bartleby also says he would prefer not to 
proof-read his own work and would prefer not to run errands. Eventually, he decides that he 
would prefer not to write at all. ‘I have given up copying,’ he announces, while taking up 
residence in the Lawyer’s office. When the Lawyer tries to dismiss him, Bartleby says he 
‘would prefer not to’ quit the office, before falling again into silence (183). 
Bartleby is sometimes interpreted to be emblematic of an oppressed subject: as an 
alienated worker (Barnett 1974), as a slave (Donaldson 1970), as a woman (Barber 1977) or 
as autistic (Sullivan 1976). However, he does not offer his own his own social perspective on 
Wall street. Rather, he insists that he is ‘not particular’ (194). With his polite insistence that 
he ‘would prefer not to’ Bartleby withdraws and stands aloof not only from his work but also 
from the epistemic environment that shapes his interaction with the Lawyer. In refusing to 
make a positive claim about what he would prefer, Bartleby declines to take on the role of 
epistemic hero. Yet his disengagement nonetheless produces an effect on the Lawyer. Like 
Hannah Gadsby, we might say that Bartleby prefers not to relieve the Lawyer’s tension for 
him. For the epistemic friction that the Lawyer experiences is not produced through the 
interaction of two different social perspectives. Rather, it is generated as a consequence of 
Bartleby’s non-cooperation in the communicative exchanges through which the Lawyer 
strives to confirm his own sense of self as competent, reasonable and compassionate. No 
doubt Bartleby is different and suffers because of it. Moreover, the narrator intuits that 
Bartleby sees the world from a different perspective than he does, which he wants to 
understand. Yet it is by withdrawing from rather than engaging with the Lawyer that Bartleby 
‘calls into question all that the narrator is’ (Springer 1965: 410). 
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The Lawyer is disarmed not only by what Bartleby says (since ‘I would prefer not to’ is 
not a direct refusal) but how he says it (since his ‘singularly mild voice’ betrays no sign of 
insubordination). The Lawyer keeps his other workers in their place, dismissing their resistant 
speech and actions as petty insubordination due to their rude manners, which he associates 
with their station as mere copyists. In contrast, the Lawyer recounts how, each time that 
Bartleby responds, he finds himself further adapting his office arrangements in order to 
accommodate Bartleby’s preferences. Despite his espoused competence, reasonableness and 
compassion, the Lawyer is infected with a mania that only grows as the story develops. On 
each occasion that Bartleby says ‘I would prefer not to’, the Lawyer is taken aback, affronted 
by Bartleby’s intransigence, yet unsure how to respond. While Bartleby remains composed, 
calm and quiescent, the Lawyer is ‘stunned’ (165), ‘touched and disconcerted’ (167), 
aggravated, irritated and excited (170). He admits that Bartleby has ‘seriously affected’ him 
in a ‘mental way’ (180). He is ‘exasperated’ (188), loses ‘all patience’ and flies ‘into a 
passion’ (194). Through his strange encounters with Bartleby, the Lawyer thus ‘senses his 
system failing, senses the edges of something beyond him, though at each possible 
breakthrough the Lawyer transfigures and cuts down these threatening notions of the limits of 
his own understanding’ (Springer 1965: 411). What is it about Bartleby’s appearance that 
affects the Lawyer so profoundly? Following Mihaela Mihai (2018), we can recognize how 
the narrator experiences epistemic friction on three inter-related registers: ideational (as the 
Lawyer encounters the limits of his assumptions about proper social conduct); moral (as he 
becomes aware of the limits of his sense of justice); and, sensorial (insofar as he reflects on 
the limits of his compassion and social embodiment). 
Bartleby’s withdrawal generates ideational epistemic friction by making the Lawyer 
aware of the limits of his social world. The lawyer becomes aware of how his own sense of 
self-mastery depends on shared assumptions about social relations that structure interactions. 
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Bartleby’s formula interrupts the Lawyer’s speech acts since it does not (quite) make sense in 
terms of the communicative presuppositions that they rely upon (Deleuze 1997, 73; see Attell 
2013: 199f.). For instance, the first time that the Lawyer calls to Bartleby to assist him to 
proof-read a copy, his action is that of a command of employer to employee. Bartleby’s 
response that he would prefer not to stuns the Lawyer with its mixture of obstinacy and 
politeness (McCall 1989: 152). The Lawyer wants to interpret Bartleby’s response as a 
refusal. When the Lawyer demands ‘Why do you refuse?’ Bartleby explains ‘I would prefer 
not to’ (167). Bartleby’s intransigence is expressed obliquely. He does not refuse to comply 
with his employer’s request outright: he does not say he ‘will not’ but that he ‘he would 
prefer not to.’ The Lawyer would be relieved if Bartleby did not want to. He burns ‘to be 
rebelled against’. But, as Deleuze (1997: 70, 71) discusses, Bartleby’s formula is ‘neither an 
affirmation nor a negation…Bartleby does not refuse’: he rejects what he does not prefer 
without affirming a preference. 
The Lawyer is disconcerted then, not only by what Bartleby says but how he says it. 
The social perspectives of members of oppressed groups are often disregarded in social 
interaction because of how they are communicated, since people from disadvantaged groups 
often do not speak with the ‘epistemological authority’ that demands ‘acknowledgment of 
one’s arguments’ (Sanders 1997: 349). The Lawyer is annoyed by Nippers’ ambition, for 
instance, and dismisses his aspiration to be more than a ‘mere copyist’ due to the way that he 
grinds his teeth and hisses rather than speaking well (160). He tolerates Turkey’s flighty 
temper and Nipper’s fieriness because he finds them both useful to him as workers. But the 
narrator experiences Bartleby’s withdrawal as disarming precisely because he does not 
respond in a manner that reflects his social difference from the narrator. Bartleby’s face does 
not show ‘a wrinkle of agitation’, which could be interpreted as impertinence or similar 
disposition that is commonly imputed to dismiss or discredit what a dominated subject says 
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(166). Rather, he treats his employer’s instructions as if ‘they were merely polite requests 
between gentlemen’, according to which polite refusal would be a socially appropriate 
response (Krips 2012, 310). Indeed, the Lawyer regards him as a fellow gentleman with 
whom he also identifies and to whom he extends certain gentlemanly privileges that he does 
not afford to his other employees, such as sharing his own room and addressing him by his 
proper name. 
The difficulty posed by Bartleby’s recalcitrance, then, is that it does not take the 
familiar ‘forms of petty, working-class insubordination’ that the Lawyer tolerates in his other 
employees (Krips 2012, 311). Rather, the ‘flute-like tone’ of Bartleby’s voice (167) and his 
‘cadaverously gentlemanly nonchalance’ make it seem to the narrator that there is ‘nothing 
ordinarily human about him’ (166). His inappropriate response calls into question the 
presupposition of the speech situation itself. What is the relation of Bartleby to the Lawyer if 
it is not structured by the role of employer and employee? Bartleby’s silence is resistant 
insofar it withdraws from the assumptions that structure social interaction. By provoking the 
Lawyer to reflect on his own assumptions about the speech situation, Bartleby’s withdrawal 
both interrupts and depletes the Lawyer’s own common sense of the world, which he assumes 
that they share (Deleuze 1997, 83-84). 
The Lawyer demonstrates a certain self-awareness about the likely infelicity of his 
speech act when he tries to dismiss Bartleby. He assumes that Bartleby will depart once he 
has instructed him to do so and given him his severance pay. He congratulates himself on his 
‘masterful management’ of the situation (184). Yet, while he has ‘built all that he had to say’ 
on that assumption, he realises ‘that assumption was simply my own, and none of Bartleby’s. 
The great point was, not whether I had assumed that he would quit me, but whether he would 
prefer to do so. He was more a man of preferences than assumptions’ (184). Bartleby’s 
behaviour appears strange because the Lawyer has mistakenly assumed that he and Bartleby 
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follow the same conventions in order to cooperate in the same practices (Attell 2013: 200). 
When he returns to his office to find Bartleby still there, he is thunderstruck. He wonders at 
the ineffectiveness of the ‘doctrine of assumptions’ according to which he usually lives his 
life. He is driven to the end of his wits when, after demanding that Bartleby resign, Bartleby 
replies ‘“I would prefer not to quit you” …gently emphasising the not’ (186).4 Far from 
exiting, Bartleby is ‘always there’ (173): he ‘never leaves’ (169) but comes to appear as a 
‘fixture’ (182) in the Lawyer’s office, a ‘perpetual sentry in the corner’ (169) where he 
‘stands mute and solitary’ (184). Bartleby disconcerts the Lawyer since he remains on his 
premises even while he declines to accept the premises of the world of Wall Street in which 
he continues to dwell. 
Bartleby’s withdrawal generates moral epistemic friction by leading the Lawyer to 
question his own sense of justice. The Lawyer sees himself as a reasonable man but begins to 
doubt whether he is in the right, after all. The ambiguity of Bartleby’s formula confounds the 
Lawyer’s expectations about the proper exchange of reasons. While the Lawyer reasons with 
Bartleby, explaining why he should be willing to proof-read his own documents, he observes 
that Bartleby seemed to consider carefully everything he said and understand its meaning yet 
‘some paramount consideration prevailed with him to reply as he did’ (167). When the 
Lawyer asks what Bartleby means, Bartleby simply repeats ‘I would prefer not to’ (166). 
When asked why he refuses, Bartleby answers ‘I would prefer not to’ (167). His formula thus 
functions not only as a statement of what he does not want to do but as an enigmatic 
explanation of why he wants not to do it. 
The Lawyer insists that since his requests ‘are made according to common usage and 
common sense’ (168) they are ‘perfectly reasonable’ (172). In contrast, he thinks that 
Bartleby is browbeating him in an ‘unprecedented and violently unreasonable way’ (168). He 
finds it difficult not to ‘bitterly exclaim upon such perverseness – such unreasonableness’ 
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(173). Yet while Bartleby’s language is not reasonable neither is it wholly unreasonable since 
it causes the Lawyer to doubt the reasonableness of his own position. The Lawyer thus begins 
to ‘stagger in his own plainest faith’ and to wonder if ‘all the justice and all the reason is on 
the other side’ (168). While he appeals to his subordinates to assure him that he has right on 
his side they too seem to oscillate between enjoying the spectacle of Bartleby confounding 
the Lawyer and resenting him for free-riding on his co-workers (168, 171).5 Yet Bartleby’s 
apparent unreasonableness only increases as the story unfolds. The Lawyer implores Bartleby 
‘to be a little reasonable’ to which, of course, Bartleby replies, hilariously, that, at present, he 
would ‘prefer not to be a little reasonable’ (180). After a time, it becomes accepted within the 
office that Bartleby ‘was permanently exempt from examining the work done by him’ and 
that he ‘was never on any account to be dispatched on the most trivial errand of any sort’ and 
‘even if entreated’ to do so, ‘it was generally understood that he would prefer not to’ (172-3). 
When the Lawyer happens to stop by his chambers on a Sunday morning, he is 
surprised to find the door locked from the inside. He is further taken aback when Bartleby 
opens the door in a dishevelled state, ‘saying quietly that he was sorry, but he was deeply 
engaged just then, and - preferred not admitting me at present’ (174). The ‘unaccountable 
scrivener’ is impervious to the legitimate expectations of the Lawyer (174). At the same time, 
however, the narrator insists that ‘it was not to be thought for a moment that Bartleby was an 
immoral person’ (175). When the Lawyer tries to make conversation with Bartleby about his 
background the following day, in order to understand why he has taken up residence in his 
chambers, Bartleby, of course, says he would prefer not to tell his employer anything about 
himself and that he would prefer ‘to be left alone here’ (181). When the Lawyer asks him to 
leave his office with severance pay, Bartleby says he would prefer not to resign or to accept 
the money. When the Lawyer demands ‘What earthly right have you to stay here? Do you 
pay any rent? Do you pay my taxes? Or is this property yours?’ Bartleby responds with 
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silence (187 – emphasis added). While directed at Bartleby, the Lawyer’s questions about the 
rightness and reasonableness of Bartleby’s actions rebound on himself and his own sense of 
entitlement, which he had previously taken for granted. 
Bartleby’s withdrawal generates sensorial epistemic friction, revealing to the Lawyer 
the limits of his compassion and leading him to become uncomfortable in his own skin. The 
Lawyer sees himself as a benevolent man but comes to doubt himself and his place in the 
world since he is unable to help Bartleby. He senses that Bartleby finds himself confined by 
the world that he more easily inhabits and is perplexed that he is unable to help him feel at 
ease. The story takes place in the Lawyer’s office on Wall Street, the financial centre of New 
York City and the office itself is surrounded by the walls of adjacent buildings. The view 
from the window at one end of the office is onto a white wall, which the Lawyer explains, is 
‘deficient in what landscape painters call “life”, while the view from the other end of the 
office is of a blackened brick wall that is ‘pushed up to within ten feet of [the] window panes’ 
(157). The Lawyer assigns Bartleby to a desk alongside a third, small side window that looks 
onto a wall only three feet away. While he partitions off the corner of the room with a screen 
to provide privacy for himself, as the story unfolds he describes Bartleby’s corner of the 
office as his ‘hermitage’ from which he would appear ghost-like only after being summoned 
thrice (169, 172, 187, 188). Increasingly Bartleby ‘would stand looking out, at his pale 
window behind the screen upon the dead brick wall’ (177). Bartleby would stand ‘motionless’ 
(163, 177) and ‘immovable’ (189) for long periods that the Lawyer characterises as one of his 
‘dead-wall reveries’ (177, 181, 188). When the Lawyer demands to know why Bartleby has 
ceased to copy as he stares at the wall, Bartleby replies indifferently, ‘Do you not see the 
reason for yourself’ (181). The Lawyer wonders whether Bartleby sees something in the wall 
that he does not, which would make Bartleby’s intransigence comprehensible. Yet he quickly 
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passes over this by speculating that Bartleby’s vision has become impaired due to the poor 
light that the small window affords (181). 
Bartleby forces the narrator to recognize the limit of his compassion. On the one hand, 
he feels ‘unmanned’ by the fact that his own employee is able to ‘dictate to him, and order 
him away from his own premises’ (174). His resentment builds so that he falls into ‘sudden 
spasmodic passions’ with Bartleby (173) and feels murderous toward him. He fears that 
Bartleby might outlive him and claim possession of his office by ‘perpetual occupancy’ 
(190). He thus comes to see Bartleby as a burden and wants to rid himself of the ‘intolerable 
incubus’ (i.e. a demon in male form, which seduces women in their sleep) (190). On the other 
hand, the Lawyer decides that Bartleby is suffering from an ‘innate and incurable disorder’ 
affecting his soul (178). He decides that he might ‘cheaply purchase a delicious self-approval’ 
by accommodating Bartleby’s strange behaviour (170). But when the Lawyer attempts to 
befriend Bartleby by ‘gently calling to him’ (178), he is met with no reply. When he clarifies 
that he is ‘not going to ask him to do anything’ but simply wishes to speak to him, Bartleby 
says that he prefers not to tell the Lawyer anything about himself. When the Lawyer asks 
what reasonable objection Bartleby could have to speaking with him in a friendly way, 
Bartleby says that he would prefer to give no answer before withdrawing in silence. The 
Lawyer reflects on the ‘terrible’ truth of the limits of benevolence as his first feelings of 
sincerest pity and ‘fraternal melancholy’ toward Bartleby turn to fear and repulsion in the 
face of ‘a certain helplessness of rectifying excessive and organic ill’ (178). He therefore 
resigns himself to accepting the situation without trying any longer to understand Bartleby or 
relieve his suffering. 
Yet, as Leo Marx (1953: 614) observes, the social order itself determines Bartleby’s 
fate. For it is only the comments of his friends and clients, who recognize how Bartleby 
makes a mockery the Lawyer’s position and status, which forces him to act. Since he is 
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unable to dismiss or evict Bartleby, the Lawyer relocates his chambers to another address 
entirely, leaving Bartleby behind. While Bartleby does not attempt to follow the Lawyer to 
his new premises, he is soon contacted by the new occupants of his old chambers asking for 
his assistance to remove Bartleby who, he is told, ‘persists in haunting the building generally’ 
and ‘refuses to do anything, he says he prefers not to; and he refuses to quit the premises’ 
(193, 192). As Marx (1953, 615) observes, at this point in the story Bartleby’s withdrawal has 
‘taken on an explicitly revolutionary character.’ For, as the landlord informs the Lawyer: 
‘everybody is concerned; clients are leaving the offices; some fears are entertained of a mob’ 
(193). 
The narrator’s experience of sensorial friction is embodied, as he becomes 
increasingly disoriented. Prior to his strange encounter with Bartleby, the narrator takes for 
granted the ‘socially contingent comfort’ he feels in being at home in his own body (Shotwell 
2009, 64). This is reflected in his self-description as a self-possessed and temperate man 
(156-157). In contrast to his own easy nature, he notices how Nippers suffers from 
indigestion, which is reflected in his ‘occasional nervous testiness and grinning irritability’ so 
that he finds it impossible to adjust his table to a comfortable height. Moreover, in contrast to 
his own self-restraint, he observes how the ‘self-indulgent habits’ of Turkey lead him to 
become obstreperous in the afternoon when there was ‘strange, inflamed flurried flighty 
recklessness of activity about him’ (158). Yet, by the end of his story, the narrator also finds 
himself in a ‘state of nervous excitement’ (187) and fears that he might lose control to the 
point of murdering Bartleby if left alone with him in his office. He no longer describes his 
chambers as a ‘snug retreat’ (156) that protects and insulates him (see DiAngelo 2011). 
Rather he likens his office to ‘a building entirely unhallowed by domestic associations – an 
uncarpeted office, doubtless, of a dusty, haggard sort of appearance’ (187). With this shift in 
perception, the narrator perhaps comes to apprehend his surroundings from a perspective 
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closer to Bartleby’s. The narrator comes to feel so out of place that, after failing to persuade 
Bartleby to leave his old offices (and even offering to take Bartleby home with him), he takes 
flight in his carriage for a few days to the upper part of town, leaving his other employees to 
take care of his business (195). While deserting the stationary Bartley, the Lawyer finds 
himself on the run, almost living in his carriage for some time while paying ‘fugitive visits’ to 
the part of town he previously moved within so freely (195). On returning to Wall St, the 
Lawyer is informed by a note from his landlord, which he opens with ‘trembling hands’ 
(196), that the police had been called and removed Bartleby to prison. 
The Lawyer learns that Bartleby did not resist his arrest but ‘in his pale unmoving 
way, silently acquiesced’ (196). When the Lawyer visits Bartleby at the Tombs he finds him 
'standing all alone in the quietest of yards, his face towards a high wall’ (197). When the 
Lawyer says his name, Bartleby responds, ‘I know you…and I want nothing to say to you’ 
(197). When the Lawyer suggests that the prison is not such a vile place, pointing to the sky 
and the grass as signs of life, Bartleby replies simply ‘I know where I am,’ after which he 
refuses to say anything more. The Lawyer arranges to pay one of the prison guards who calls 
himself the ‘grub-man’ to ensure that Bartleby is well-fed. However, when asked what he will 
have for dinner, Bartleby replies to the grub-man, ‘I would prefer not to dine today’, 
explaining that it would ‘disagree’ with him since he is ‘unused to dinners’, before he returns 
to his position, ‘fronting the dead-wall’ (198). When the Lawyer returns to the Tombs a few 
days later, he finds Bartleby, apparently asleep, ‘strangely huddled up at the base of the wall’, 
before realising that he is dead (199). The fraternal melancholy that Bartleby induces in the 
Lawyer rings hollow in the final trite declaration of the narrator: ‘Ah Bartleby! Ah 
humanity!’ (200). 
 
The World-Disclosing Potential of Epistemic Friction 
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That Bartleby dies alone in the Tombs seems to highlight the limitations of interpreting his 
withdrawal as an effective mode of politics. Unlike Medina’s epistemic heroes who always 
act within chains of action, Bartleby appears as a solitary and lonely figure. Moreover, far 
from being an act of self-care, his withdrawal from the Lawyer seems to involve a withdrawal 
from all human society to the point that he can no longer survive at all. The story itself 
suggests, then, that we should not be too quick to interpret withdrawal as a mode of resistance 
rather than a symptom of social suffering (see McNay 2014). Indeed, as Hardt and Negri 
(2000: 203-204) highlight, the solitary nature of Bartleby’s withdrawal seems to end only in 
‘social suicide’ (cf. Oliver 1945). 
Withdrawal arguably only becomes political when it is undertaken out of concern not 
just for the self but the world shared with others (Krips 2012: 309). While individuals such 
Edo-Lodge and Gadsby might act as epistemic anti-heroes, their individual actions are indeed 
supported by social networks that provide discursive and material resources to be politically 
intelligible and effective. Withdrawal, then, seems unlikely to generate epistemic friction in 
the absence of positive claims articulated by social movements, which also challenge active 
ignorance directly. This interpretation seems to vindicate Hardt and Negri’s claim that 
withdrawal can only be the first step in an emancipatory politics. For, if the gesture of 
‘subtracting ourselves from a relationship of domination’ is essential for any emancipatory 
politics, they suggest that it risks remaining empty unless it is accompanied by an affirmative 
moment of constituting power (Hardt & Negri 2000: 204; see Attell 2003: 210-213). Indeed, 
in contrast to Bartleby, both Gadsby and Eddo-Lodge stage withdrawals in order to establish 
the terms on which they might be prepared to engage. Moreover, both continue to confront 
active ignorance on their own terms, with Eddo-Lodge producing her podcast ‘About Race’ 
and Hannah Gadsby returning with her comedy show Douglas. 
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For Slavoj Žižek (2006: 382), however, Bartleby’s passive resistance is ‘not merely 
the first, preparatory stage, for a second, more “constructive,” work of forming a new 
alternative order; it is the very source and background of this order, its permanent 
foundation.’ For Hardt and Negri, the negative moment of Bartleby’s refusal would be 
overcome through the actualization of his freedom through positing an alternative social 
order. For Žižek, in contrast, Bartleby’s potential for an active resistance is not immanent to 
his negation of the existing order.6 Rather, Bartleby intimates a kind of politics that ‘opens up 
a new space outside the hegemonic position and its negation’ (Žižek 2006: 382). For, in 
declining to comply with his employer’s instruction, Bartleby ‘does not say that he doesn’t 
want to do it; he says that he prefers (wants) not to do it’ (Žižek 2006: 381). In doing so, he 
gestures toward a politics would decline ‘all the forms of resisting which help the system to 
reproduce itself by ensuring our participation in it’ (Žižek 2006: 383). Giorgio Agamben 
(2014, 71) similarly points to the ‘destitutent power’ exemplified by Bartelby’s withdrawal, 
which would ‘deactivate every juridical and social property, without establishing a new 
identity’ (cf. Agamben 2009; Whyte 2009). 
When interpreted along these lines, Melville’s story indicates how withdrawal from 
what Mariana Ortega (2006) calls ‘loving, knowing ignorance’ might generate epistemic 
friction in the absence of a positive demand. An acute risk of participating in political 
discourse as a member of an oppressed group is that one’s words and actions are colonized by 
a hegemonic discourse, thereby re-inscribing the privileged perspective that epistemic friction 
is supposed to call into question (see Sanders 1997; Young 2001). However, as Michael 
Rogin (1979, 195-196) observes, in ‘refusing to explain himself’ Bartleby both ‘protects 
himself from colonization’ and ‘drains his surroundings of the humanity in which the lawyer 
would like to believe.’ Withdrawal is potentially world-disclosing, then, insofar as it makes 
visible how active ignorance structures the communicative setting in which deliberative 
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exchanges take place. Otherwise isolated acts by epistemic anti-heroes become political, then, 
when they disrupt the sensibilities of their audience (Krips 2012, 310). In this way, 
withdrawal is not only instrumental and individual as an act of self-care; it becomes political 
through its power to turn the tension that members of oppressed groups experience everyday 
back onto the dominant. 
Yet, it would also be implausible to interpret the story simply as a depiction of the 
Lawyer’s journey out of active ignorance and into epistemic lucidity. The Lawyer sees 
himself as a decent, patient and generous and wants to confirm his own self-perception in 
recounting his strange encounter with Bartleby. While he intuits the limitations of his own 
social world due to the epistemic friction he encounters, he remains ‘irrevocably wedded to 
what he thinks he is’ (Springer 1965, 418). Indeed, the Lawyer does end up placing Bartleby 
in a certain way when he assures the prison officer that he was ‘a perfectly honest man, and 
greatly to be compassionated, however unaccountably eccentric’ (196; see Springer 1965; 
417). Consequently, he is able to relieve some of the epistemic friction he had encountered by 
maintaining his respect and compassion for Bartleby, despite being implicated in Bartleby’s 
suffering and death (195). As Springer (1965: 413) observes: ‘When he is done with Bartleby 
he can, with some uneasiness, congratulate himself on his handling of a situation that was in 
the main beyond him.’ 
Despite his good intentions and his effort to be charitable and decent, one thus also 
senses in the Lawyer’s narrative, the three epistemic vices highlighted by Medina. Despite his 
desire to find out what is wrong with Bartleby, the Lawyer remains epistemically arrogant in 
presuming to know what is good for him: ‘Either you must do something or something must 
be done to you’ (194). Despite his sense of responsibility toward Bartleby, the Lawyer 
remains epistemically lazy in not needing to know what would become of him when he 
relocated office to escape him: ‘I now strove to be entirely care-free and quiescent; and my 
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conscience justified me in the attempt’ (195). Despite his attempt to ensure Bartleby is well-
looked after in prison, he remains epistemically closed-minded in needing not to know about 
the suffering he experiences: ‘And see, it is not so sad a place as one might think. Look, there 
is a sky, and here is the grass’ (197).  
However, as Dan McCall highlights, the tendency of some critics to chastise the 
Lawyer as self-absorbed, self-deceived and blind to his own complicity in the system that 
destroys Bartleby, flatten out what is most engaging in the story. Such readings typically rely 
on a kind of ideology critique, the aim of which is to see through the unreliable narrator in 
order to ‘expose him for the inadequate and misguided man he really is’ (McCall 1989: 103). 
Interpreting the story as a dramatization of the Lawyer’s experience of epistemic friction, in 
contrast, enables the reader to identify with the narrator in his struggle to understand Bartleby 
even as we take subversive pleasure in watching him unravel (McCall 1989: 100). Rather 
than stand in judgement of the Lawyer as an epistemic villain, we can instead empathise with 
the psychological drama he recounts of his own dawning self-awareness of his failure to 
understand Bartleby. For it is through his own story that the world of the Lawyer is disclosed 
to the reader as he describes how, despite his initial over-estimation of his own cognitive 
competencies, they fail him when confronted by the enigmatic Bartleby (McCall 1989: 108). 
The effect of Bartleby’s formula on the narrator is to induce in him a self-doubt that almost 
drives him crazy and leads him to an intensive self-examination that he shares with his 
readers (McCall 1989: 128). The Lawyer’s narrative is thus driven by his effort to understand 
what is wrong with Bartleby. However, the world-disclosing power of story lies in what it 
reveals about the narrator. Rather than trying to explain why Bartleby withdraws, therefore, 
the reader’s attention shifts to the narrator’s experience of estrangement, discomfort and 
disorientation from the social world that he once moved so effortlessly within (Rogin 1979, 
196). As Dan McCall (1989, 144) observes: ‘Bartleby throws you back on yourself in 
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sputtering exasperation and self-justifying. You cannot ‘fix’ Bartleby, so one thing you do is 
talk about yourself- it’s not my fault, I’m a good guy, don’t look at me.’ As readers, we take 
pleasure in observing how all the Lawyer’s best efforts to make Bartleby see reason fail and 
his safe world is thrown into question. 
But to look to the story primarily as a moral lesson on how to cultivate epistemic 
virtues and eradicate epistemic vices would also be to miss its world-disclosing power 
(Mrovlje 2019). When interpreted with an aesthetic sensibility, the story rather enables a 
reflexivity on the part of the reader about the limits and possibilities of the political 
responsiveness that withdrawal might provoke. The distance that the reader enjoys as 
spectator of the Lawyer’s encounter with Bartleby enables political reflection on how the 
experience of epistemic friction might be seized as an opportunity for privileged subjects to 
arrest active ignorance while remaining attentive to the ever-present risk of reproducing it. 
For the story also intimates the lengths that privileged subjects will go in their need not to 
know about oppressive social relations as we witness the Lawyer’s response when Bartleby 
says: ‘don’t you see the reason for yourself.’ Rather than contemplate more carefully the wall 
with which Bartleby is preoccupied and reflect more deeply on the field of the invisible 
structures his own vision, the Lawyer surmises from the ‘dull and glazed’ look in his eyes 
that it is Bartleby’s vision, which must be ‘temporarily impaired’ (181). 
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cried Captain Delano, more and more astonished and pained; “you are saved: what has cast 
such a shadow upon you?” Cereno’s answer, which Ellison omits, is: ‘The Negro’. As 
William Spanos (2008, 441-442) observes, ‘What Benito Cereno “sees” as he speaks this 
simple stunning word is too complicated for any easy discursive answer. But we can get at its 
existential force indirectly by suggesting that it and the resonant silence surrounding its 
utterance bring to sudden and intensely ominous – spectral – visibility everything that 
Captain Delano’s discourse...during that day on the San Dominick left necessarily unsaid, 
everything that…was invisible to his vision.’ 
4 As Deleuze (1997: 73) observes, all of the Lawyer’s ‘hopes of bringing Bartleby back to 
reason are dashed because they rest on a logic of presuppositions according to which an 
employer ‘expects’ to be obeyed, or a kind friend listened to, whereas Bartleby has invented a 
new logic, a logic of preference, which is enough to undermine the presuppositions of 
language as a whole.’ 
5 The first time he asks them, Turkey blandly agrees that he thinks the Lawyer is right, while 
Nippers ventures that he should ‘kick him out of the office’ and Ginger Nut suggests that 
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Bartleby is ‘a little luny’ (168). A few days later, Turkey is so incensed by Bartleby’s 
withdrawal that he offers to ‘black his eyes’ (171). Nippers is more measured, saying that it is 
for the Lawyer to decide if Bartleby should be dismissed, while agreeing that his conduct is 
‘quite unusual, and indeed unjust’ toward his fellow employees, although it might ‘only be a 
passing whim’ (171). 
6 As Attell (2013, 218) explains, for Žižek Bartleby is, rather, ‘the embodiment, or the 
placeholder, of a negativity or potentiality that exists and persists as such, and does not 
simply efface itself or disappear in the onto-political drama of becoming.’ 
